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SURROGACY AND WINDSOR’S PENUMBRAS
Susan Frelich Appleton*
INTRODUCTION
This symposium, Compensated Surrogacy in the Age of Windsor, 1
explores what the Supreme Court’s invalidation of Section 3 of the
federal “Defense of Marriage Act” (DOMA) in United States v.
Windsor 2 means for the legal treatment of commercial surrogacy
arrangements. 3 As a scholar with a longstanding interest in family law
generally and parentage and assisted reproduction in particular, I found
much to appreciate in the symposium contributions—especially those
insights that come from examining the issues through the always
revealing lenses of feminism, 4 critical race theory, 5 heteronormativity, 6
and outsider narrative. 7

* Lemma Barkeloo & Phoebe Couzins Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis. I
thank my colleagues Deborah Dinner, Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, and Laura Rosenbury for
valuable comments and conversation.
1. 89 WASH. L. REV. 1069–1373 (2014).
2. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).
3. Like contributors to the symposium, I use “compensated” and “commercial” interchangeably
and would contrast this type of surrogacy with arrangements described as “altruistic,” in which the
surrogate donates her services and receives no pay. See, e.g., Kellye Y. Testy, Foreword:
Compensated Surrogacy in the Age of Windsor, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1069, 1070 & n.9 (2014). Of
course, one could consider further distinctions. For example, to what extent does mere
reimbursement for medical expenses constitute “compensation” even if we would not label the
arrangement “commercial”? For purposes of my analysis, I assume that a commercial or
compensated surrogate receives a fee for her services, in addition to reimbursement for her
expenses.
4. Sara L. Ainsworth, Bearing Children, Bearing Risks: Feminist Leadership for Progressive
Regulation of Compensated Surrogacy in the United States, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1077 (2014); Julie
Shapiro, For a Feminist Considering Surrogacy, Is Compensation Really the Key Question?, 89
WASH. L. REV. 1345 (2014); see also Martha A. Field, Compensated Surrogacy, 89 WASH. L. REV.
1155, 1155 (2014) (raising concerns about the commodification of, inter alia, birthmothers).
5. Khiara M. Bridges, Windsor, Surrogacy, and Race, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1125 (2014).
6. Anthony C. Infanti, The House of Windsor: Accentuating the Heteronormativity in the Tax
Incentives for Procreation, 89 WASH L. REV. 1185 (2014).
7. Peter Nicolas, Straddling the Columbia: A Constitutional Law Professor’s Musings on
Circumventing Washington State’s Criminal Prohibition on Compensated Surrogacy, 89 WASH. L.
REV. 1235 (2014). Placing contemporary law reform efforts in historical and political contexts also
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Despite the value of the analyses presented, however, the “prompt”—
Windsor’s implications for commercial surrogacy—originally struck me
as both superficial and contrived. Perhaps I was thinking too much like a
lawyer, reacting to the fact that nothing in the Windsor opinions directly
compels a shift for surrogacy. Put differently, it is not immediately
obvious that Windsor’s rejection of DOMA’s Section 3 has any bearing
on state surrogacy laws. Accordingly, for me, Professor Field got it
exactly right when she wrote:
Windsor has little relevance to surrogacy, which will continue to
be governed by state rather than federal law. States do, and will,
follow a wide spectrum of policies on surrogacy, ranging from
banning it and making it illegal to promoting it by enforcing
surrogacy contracts as ordinary commercial transactions. The
legalization of gay marriage need not affect states’ surrogacy
laws. 8
Nonetheless, stepping back and situating Windsor and surrogacy in
broader conversations about gender, marriage, and family law can open
additional ways to understand the question posed by this symposium.
From this wider perspective, Justice Kennedy’s analysis in Windsor (like
various constitutional guarantees) might be said to have “penumbras”
and “emanations” that reach beyond the case’s direct impact or
precedential role. 9 Below, I briefly consider two such penumbral matters
pertaining to surrogacy, Windsor’s politics and its repronormativity,
before turning to a more extended look at a third, Windsor’s federalism.
Even with this expanded frame, the path from Windsor to significant
surrogacy reform largely remains uncertain and obscure. Windsor’s
reasoning about marriage and dignity 10 promises only inclusion in the
system of family law as it is, not fundamental transformation of that
system itself. 11

proves illuminating. See Terry J. Price, The Future of Compensated Surrogacy in Washington State:
Anytime Soon?, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1311 (2014).
8. See Field, supra note 4, at 1155.
9. Most readers will recognize that I am borrowing terms made famous by Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Unable to identify a constitutional provision securing a right to
privacy, including the protection of married couples’ use of contraception, the majority cited the
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution and invoked their
“penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.”
Id. at 484.
10. 133 S. Ct. at 2692–96.
11. See also, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and
Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,” 79 VA.
L. REV. 1535 (1993).
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WINDSOR’S POLITICS

Although Windsor stems from the judicial branch, the case has
political ramifications. First, Windsor now looms large in the social
movement for LGBTQ rights, spurring marriage-equality advocacy,
legislation, and court rulings within the states. In the United States
today, same-sex couples have access to marriage in more than 37
jurisdictions.12 Just as Justice Scalia’s Windsor dissent predicted, 13 the
portions of the majority opinion that explain how DOMA demeans
same-sex couples and their families have proved influential in
challenges to state marriage exclusions, with several courts invoking
Windsor to invalidate such laws. 14 Now that one federal court of appeals
has refused to embrace this expansive reading of Windsor, the Supreme
Court has agreed to review the constitutionality of state bans on samesex marriage and marriage recognition. 15
Second, beyond its implications for the rapidly developing law and
politics of marriage equality, Windsor’s emanations might reach even
farther, as suggested by the argument animating this symposium. This
argument seems to proceed as follows: To the extent Windsor
“legitimizes” same-sex couples, it creates increased demand for
reproductive arrangements that allow such couples to become parents. In
turn, this demand generates political pressure for reforms that would
facilitate and regularize such family formation. For example, New York,
which became a marriage-equality state by legislation before Windsor, 16
now faces pressure to reconsider its prohibition on compensated
surrogacy, enacted back in 1992. 17 A chief proponent of a more
permissive approach to surrogacy is a New York state senator who, with
his husband, had a child with the help of a gestational surrogate in
California. 18 Windsor might well fuel such efforts to relax the legal
12. According to the advocacy organization Freedom to Marry, same-sex couples can marry in
37 states, D.C., and some counties in Missouri. Where State Laws Stand, FREEDOM TO MARRY,
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/where-state-laws-stand (last visited Feb. 13, 2015).
13. 133 S. Ct. at 2709–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14. E.g., Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 468, 473–74 (9th Cir.), stay denied, 135 S. Ct. 345 (2014);
Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 659, 671–72 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); Bostic
v. Rainey, 760 F.3d 352, 377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 286 (2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755
F.3d 1193, 1207–08 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014).
15. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted sum. nom. Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015).
16. New York enacted its Marriage Equality Act in 2011. N.Y. DOM. REL. L. §§ 10-a, 10-b, 11,
13 (McKinney, Westlaw, through 2015 legislation).
17. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 122–23 (McKinney, Westlaw, through 2015 legislation).
18. See Anemona Hartocollis, And Surrogacy Makes 3: In New York, a Push for Compensated
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treatment of surrogacy, although the revision that Windsor works in
federal law would seem to be a much less influential force here than
state-level developments that open marriage to same-sex couples. Of
course, we might think of Windsor as catalyst in the expansion of
marriage at the state level 19 and hence as potential catalyst for surrogacy
reforms as well.
Will such Windsor-inspired pressure produce surrogacy reforms?
Possibly. We might consider, for example, how the demand for less
onerous divorce rules and the frequent evasion of restrictive laws
through the practice of migratory divorce sparked the move for divorce
reform and ultimately brought no-fault divorce statutes to the states. 20 If
“[f]amily law follows family life,” 21 as Joanna Grossman and Lawrence
Friedman contend in their history of modern family law, then a growing
practice of compensated surrogacy (including resort to out-of-state
arrangements) should produce a more supportive legal environment.
Further, LGBTQ advocates have become politically influential and
could make surrogacy reform their next priority after marriage
equality. 22
Still, I see significant stumbling blocks. With the fault system of
divorce, a consensus had emerged that the existing regime caused
significant harm and provided at most illusory benefits. 23 Likewise, the
shift represented by Windsor came in response to inferences of DOMA’s
great harm and the absence of evidence that change would pose a
problem. 24 Surrogacy restrictions like New York’s, however, differ from
both of these precursors.
First, surrogacy restrictions were enacted amidst worries about the
exploitation of women and the commodification of children. 25 Whatever
the increased demand for compensated surrogacy, we have not reached a
consensus that such restrictions reflect misguided concerns or cause
Surrogacy,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Feb.
20,
2014,
at
E1
&
E6,
t
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/20/fashion/In-New-York-Some-Couples-Push-for-Legalizationof-Compensated-Surrogacy.html.
19. See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW
AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 159–80 (2011).
21. Id. at 2.
22. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 415 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted sum. nom. Obergefell
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015).
23. See, e.g., GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 20, at 163.
24. See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
25. See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Privacy, Surrogacy, and the Baby M Case, 76 GEO. L.J. 1759
(1988); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1928–36 (1987).
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more harm than good. 26 Second, in contrast to the law felled by Windsor,
basic anti-surrogacy laws do not seek to demean and disadvantage
gays. 27 They reflect not anti-LGBTQ animus, which inflicts dignitary
harms, 28 but instead protective policies that were seen at the time of
enactment to trump the competing interests of even different-sex married
(but infertile) couples and enterprising would-be “surrogates”
themselves. 29 In other words, when states like New York enacted
surrogacy restrictions, they did so for the purpose of protecting women
and children; moreover, they found the need for such protection to
outweigh the interests of likely surrogacy consumers (then envisioned to
be married different-sex couples with a fertile husband and an infertile
wife 30) as well as the interests of women who might feel eager to serve
as gestational carriers for others.
True, some surrogacy laws might need fine-tuning today, given
Windsor’s condemnation of DOMA’s discriminatory purpose. For
example, some states limit surrogacy to married couples31—a category
that at one time excluded all same-sex couples—and others assume that
intended parents will be a man and a woman. 32 Yet, even before
Windsor, courts in several states insisted that paternity and parentage
laws be read in a gender-neutral way, when possible. This approach to
statutory construction has extended legal recognition as parents to same26. See, e.g., Field, supra note 4; Shapiro, supra note 4. See also Hiring a Woman for Her
TIMES,
Sept.
22,
2014,
Womb,
Room
for
Debate,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/09/22/hiring-a-woman-for-her-womb
(presenting
different positions, as articulated by two lawyers, an ethicist, a law professor, and a professor of
obstetrics and psychiatrist).
27. The Windsor majority finds telling evidence of DOMA’s discriminatory purpose in the name
itself: the Defense of Marriage Act. 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
28. See id.
29. See generally Field, supra note 4.
30. This stereotype derives from the highly publicized Baby M case that prompted legislation in
several states. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (holding compensated traditional
surrogacy contract void and enforceable).
31. E.g., TEX. FAM. CODE § 160.754(b) (2003).
32. For example, an early model law, the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception
Act, promulgated by the National Conference of Commissions of Uniform State Laws (now called
the Uniform Law Commission or ULC) in 1988, included the following provision for those states
opting to permit surrogacy:
“Intended parents” means a man and woman, married to each other, who enter into an
agreement under this [Act] providing that they will be the parents of a child born to a surrogate
through assisted conception using egg or sperm of one or both of the intended parents.
UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 1(3) (1988). The language makes
clear that same-sex couples would be ineligible as “intended parents.” The ULC’s more recent
model also contemplates a cross-sex couple as intended parents without requiring their marriage.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(b) (2002).
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sex couples and facilitated the intended results of assisted-reproduction
arrangements for such families. 33 To the extent that such developments
eliminate discriminatory barriers to surrogacy, they address any
Windsor-related problems. Accordingly, states that still follow gendered
rules of paternity and parentage might well need to move to a genderneutral approach. By contrast, Windsor does not compel revision of
those restrictions that apply to all surrogacy consumers and reflect more
general protective policies aimed at commodification and exploitation.
The possibly increased demand for surrogacy in Windsor’s wake does
not alter this conclusion.
To see why we should not expect to see protective policies evaporate
in the face of Windsor, consider this analogous question: Because many
same-sex couples add children to their families by adoption, should we
expect to see post-Windsor relaxation of various protective adoption
laws—such as requirements for waiting periods 34 and home studies, 35
which apply regardless of the sexual orientation or gender of the
adopters? Of course not. Similarly, the rise of gay married couples and
their possible demand for surrogacy do not diminish concerns about
commodification and exploitation—concerns that prompted restrictions
back when different-sex couples were surrogacy’s principal consumers.
To conclude otherwise would suggest that the extra quantum of male
privilege possessed by gay couples would produce political success
where it has eluded different-sex couples with fertility-challenged wives.
Such speculation seems far-fetched. Hence, once surrogacy restrictions
are purged of any elements that target sexual minorities, 36 I see no
reason to expect additional reforms stemming from Windsor.
33. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 665 (Cal. 2005) (recognizing mother’s
former partner under gender-neutral reading of paternity statute); Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3d 283,
285 (N. Mex. 2012) (applying presumption of paternity to recognize as second parent mother’s
former partner who held out adopted child as her own); In re Roberto d. B., 923 A.2d 115, 125 (Md.
2007) (using gender-neutral reading of state law to allow intended father’s name alone to appear on
birth certificate of child born to gestational surrogate and conceived with donated egg); see also
D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 328 (Fla. 2013) (post-Windsor case using gender-neutral reading
of paternity law).
34. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/9 (Westlaw, through 2015 legislation) (requiring
valid surrender of child for adoption to take place no sooner than seventy-two hours after birth).
35. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 600.8 (Westlaw, through 2015 legislation) (specifying the
requirements of “preplacement investigation” and report).
36. Here, my argument suggests the familiar distinction between discriminatory intent and
disparate impact. See, e.g., Richard Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three,
117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 494–95 (2003) (identifying three types of questions about “[t]he
relationship between equal protection and facially neutral practices with discriminatory effects”). In
any event, Windsor makes clear that anti-gay animus played a pivotal role in its analysis. See
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
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WINDSOR’S REPRONORMATIVITY

Second, Windsor shares at least attenuated connections with
surrogacy because of the repronormativity reflected in the majority
opinion. I use this term, which derives from Katherine Franke’s
scholarship, to underscore the centrality of children and parenthood in
Windsor’s vision of marriage and also the centrality of marriage in
Windsor’s understanding of parenthood and children. 37
While rejecting a model of marriage that depends exclusively on
procreation, 38 the majority opinion nonetheless gave the children of gay
and lesbian couples a prominent place in its analysis. According to the
majority, one of DOMA’s fatal flaws lay in its effect on children:
[Section 3 of DOMA] humiliates tens of thousands of children
now being raised by same-sex couples. The law in question
makes it even more difficult for the children to understand the
integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with
other families in their community and in their daily lives. 39
In these sentences, the Court writes as if all, or at least most, of the
married couples marginalized by DOMA have children—despite the
childless marriage of Edith Windsor, who brought the case. In this way,
the majority’s effort to celebrate diversity in marriage reinforces a vision
of marriage tied to children and childrearing.
Whatever its direct legal effect, then, Windsor stands out as a highprofile cultural and social artifact that sends strong signals about
marriage norms. Windsor could have invalidated DOMA without
mentioning children, citing their numbers, or expressing empathy for
their feelings. The stakes for childless same-sex couples could have
amply justified the outcome, as Windsor’s own tax burden
demonstrates. 40 The Court made a choice, citing a marriage-equality
argument designed to tug at the heartstrings of those who might find
37. Although Katherine Franke famously uses “repronormativity” to critique the centrality of
motherhood in feminist agendas, I use the term more broadly here, to call attention to the Windsor
Court’s assumptions about marriage. Windsor not only emphasizes the place of children in
marriage; it also suggests that, without marriage, children suffer emotional harm. Put differently,
while Franke challenges the centrality of motherhood in legal feminism, I point out centrality of
parenthood in Windsor’s rationale. See Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on
Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 183 (2001).
38. Justice Alito’s dissent criticizes the majority on this ground. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at
2718–19 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing two understandings of marriage, one based on
procreation and the other based on consent, and asserting that Congress and the states may choose
which to endorse through their enactments).
39. Id. at 2694.
40. See id. at 2683–85.
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“second-tier marriage” 41 a not especially compelling problem (or even
well-deserved marginalization) when it disadvantages only adults. 42
In so doing, the Windsor majority entrenched a limited view of
family, realizing a hazard that some observers have identified in
contemporary gay rights advocacy. 43 This symposium’s premise—
linking Windsor to surrogacy—not only illuminates this feature of
Windsor, but also strengthens it. This paradigm excludes many family
forms, for example, unmarried couples and individuals who might use
surrogacy, unmarried and married couples who want no children, and a
host of other affiliations and domestic situations, from friendships to
polyamory. 44 A robust commitment to pluralism among families would
decenter married couples and families with children—understanding
these as just a few of many possible familial arrangements.
Whatever its merits or problems—as a matter of substance or judicial
strategy—Windsor’s repronormativity only returns us to the issue of
Windsor’s politics. Even if Windsor’s repronormativity could be said
indirectly to increase demand for surrogacy, translating such demand
into concrete pro-surrogacy reforms remains unlikely, especially where
demand by different-sex couples has failed to achieve that end. In the
meantime, the argument itself has troubling implications for family
pluralism.
III. WINDSOR’S FEDERALISM
The Windsor majority’s compassion for families headed by same-sex
married couples, its antisubordination theme, 45 and its professed concern
for humiliated children 46 have all largely eclipsed its encomium to

41. Id. at 2684.
42. Later opinions have picked up on Windsor’s child-focused reasoning. See, e.g., Baskin v.
Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 659, 671–72 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); DeBoer v. Snyder,
772 F.3d 388, 422 (6th Cir. 2014) (Daughtrey, J., dissenting), cert. granted sum. nom. Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015).
43. See, e.g., NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL
FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2009); Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v.
Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (2004); see also Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106
MICH. L. REV. 189 (2007).
44. See, e.g., POLIKOFF, supra note 43; Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory
Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277 (2004); Katherine
M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685 (2008); see also Rachel F. Moran, How
Second-Wave Feminism Forgot the Single Woman, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 223 (2004).
45. See supra notes 10, 13–14, and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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federalism. 47 This part of the opinion emphasizes the traditional control
of families and family relationships by the states, in turn prompting a
skeptical look at Congress’s intervention through DOMA. 48 Most federal
district courts and courts of appeals, in relying on Windsor to invalidate
state bans both on same-sex marriage and on recognition of such
marriages performed elsewhere, have glossed over the Court’s
reaffirmation of federalism in family law. Instead, these courts have
stressed Windsor’s condemnation of unequal treatment. 49
The current regulation of surrogacy epitomizes the federalist or
localist approach to family law that Windsor embraces. In fact, taken
seriously, this strand of the Windsor opinion poses difficulties for those
who now ask the Supreme Court to require all states to license and
recognize marriages of same-sex couples. A majority of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit pointed out this problem in the case
currently under consideration by the Supreme Court. 50 Assuming that
marriage-equality advocates will nonetheless prevail when the Supreme
Court decides this case, gendered entry requirements for marriage will
join many other aspects of family law in which state rules have had to
yield to federal constitutional protections. For example, states no longer
exercise unfettered control over limitations on contraception 51 and
abortion, 52 the parental status of unmarried fathers, 53 the treatment of
nonmarital children, 54 and visitation by grandparents and other third
parties. 55 Add to constitutional constraints the often-used power of
Congress to shape state family laws by attaching conditions to federal
funding 56 or in enacting family-affecting statutes on taxation, welfare,
and employment benefits, 57 and it becomes tempting to agree completely

47. 133 S. Ct. at 2689–93.
48. See id.
49. See supra note 14 (citing illustrative cases) and accompanying text. The principal outlier is
the opinion from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, to which the Supreme Court has
granted review. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
50. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 413–15 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted sum. nom. Obergefell
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015).
51. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
52. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
53. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
54. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1971); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
55. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
56. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 667(a)–(b) (2012) (child support guidelines); 42 U.S.C. §§ 673b, 675(5)
(2012) (Adoption and Safe Families Act).
57. See JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 45–59 (2014) (examining various
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with those who see federalism in family law as a myth. 58
Against this background of extensive federal authority and influence,
however, the “legal patchwork” 59 or “maze of laws, state by state” 60
applicable to surrogacy today provides a telling counterexample.
Surrogacy helps sustain the traditional story that family law belongs to
the states.
The state-by-state variation in laws governing surrogacy 61 results in
several predictable consequences. First, supporters of surrogacy have
pursued several different paths toward eliminating bans and decreasing
restrictions. Some have focused their reformist efforts on state
legislatures. 62 Others have called for a national statute allowing
surrogacy 63 or the elimination of most limitations through judicial
recognition of a constitutional right to procreate by means of
surrogacy. 64 Yet, law reform projects do not always yield hoped-for
outcomes and, in any event, take time. 65
Thus, a second, more practical and immediately available response
for those in restrictive states entails arrangements that take advantage of
the laws of more surrogacy-friendly jurisdictions. For example,
Professor Nicolas, who lives in Washington (which bans surrogacy),
describes how such considerations figured in his and his husband’s plans
to have a child. 66 First, he considered attempting to locate a surrogate in
California because of its especially hospitable laws. 67 Ultimately, for
reasons of proximity and costs, he chose to work with a woman in
nearby Oregon, where he found compensated surrogacy flourishing “in

federal laws affecting families).
58. Id. at 17–66 (challenging canonical narrative of family law as local, not federal, law);
Courtney G. Joslin, Federalism and Family Status, 90 IND. L.J. 787 (2015) (critiquing the “myth” of
“family law localism”).
59. Nicolas, supra note 7, at 1239.
60. Tamar Lewin, Surrogates and Couples Face Maze of Laws, State by State, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
18, 2014, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/18/us/surrogates-and-couples-face-a-maze-oflaws-state-by-state.html.
61. For a survey of the various state approaches and their categorization into six identifiable
groupings, see Nicolas, supra note 7, at 1240–45.
62. See, e.g., Hartocollis, supra note 18, at E1; Price, supra note 7.
63. E.g., Caitlin Conklin, Note, Simply Inconsistent: Surrogacy Laws in the United States and the
Pressing Need for Regulation, 35 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 67, 92–94 (2013).
64. JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 32–40 (1993); Nicolas, supra note 7, at 1279–98.
65. See Price, supra note 7.
66. Nicolas, supra note 7, at 1245–55.
67. Id. at 1245.
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the shadows,” that is, despite the absence of explicitly relevant law. 68
The phenomenon of traveling to a state with more attractive laws
occurs frequently in family law. Other examples, past and present,
include migratory divorce before the advent of no-fault statutes 69 and
today’s efforts to avoid local abortion regulations. 70
The likelihood that state surrogacy restrictions would prompt evasion
in this familiar fashion surfaced for consideration as soon as New Jersey
began to contemplate legislative responses invited by the provocative
Baby M case in 1988. 71 As part of that process, the New Jersey Bioethics
Commission consulted me about the conflict of laws implications of a
ban on surrogacy that the state was contemplating. My analysis, later
revised for publication as a law review article,72 concluded that New
Jersey would have considerable difficulty limiting surrogacy so long as
those eager to participate in such arrangements could find more
permissive jurisdictions. Accordingly, I wrote:
[A]ssuming residents of a restrictive state truly want to
participate in surrogacy, the existence of more hospitable
jurisdictions will significantly limit local control. Absent federal
legislation or a single uniform act (without alternatives) adopted
by all the states, restrictive states can hope to achieve their goals
only through resort to untested extensions of criminal law or
creative solutions making the family formed through surrogacy
vulnerable to continuing risks. 73
Subsequent case law confirmed my suspicions. Consider Hodas v.
Morin, 74 in which a couple from Connecticut commissioned a New York
68. Id. at 1246–49.
69. See, e.g., David P. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and
Borax, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 26 (1966).
70. See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, Activists Help Pay for Patients’ Travel to Shrinking Number of
Abortion Clinics, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/28/us/advocateshelp-pay-for-travel-to-a-shrinking-number-of-abortion-clinics.html; Samantha Liss, Out-of-State
Abortion Providers Ready to Treat More Missouri Women, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 25,
2014,
http://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-med-fit/medical/out-of-state-abortion-providersready-to-treat-more-missouri/article_871a4f64-2579-5dd1-b380-ef042ed28e06.html.
71. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (holding compensated traditional surrogacy contract void and
unenforceable).
72. Susan Frelich Appleton, Surrogacy Arrangements and the Conflict of Laws, 1990 WIS. L.
REV. 399, 401 (1990).
73. Id. at 401. The reference to alternatives stems from the Uniform Status of Children of
Assisted Conception Act, which offered enacting states two options, Alternative A, permitting but
regulating surrogacy, and Alternative B, making surrogacy agreements void—in turn undermining
the uniformity that might be achieved by this so-called uniform act. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF
ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT (1988).
74. 814 N.E.2d 320 (Mass. 2004).
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woman to serve as a gestational carrier and bear for them a child
conceived with their genes, with the embryo transfer taking place in
Connecticut. Connecticut had no controlling authority on the subject, but
New York “expressly prohibit[ed] gestational carrier agreements in
order to protect women against exploitation as gestational carriers and to
protect the gestational carrier’s potential parental rights,” 75 thus
expressing “a ‘fundamental policy’ on a matter in which it [had] a great
interest.” 76 By contrast, Massachusetts, based on precedent, allowed the
name of intended, genetic parents to be entered on the birth certificate
even when another woman bears the child, 77 facilitating the objectives of
those entering a gestational surrogacy arrangement. Among these
disparate laws, the parties wanted Massachusetts law to govern
parentage and the birth certificate, and they included a choice of law
provision to that effect in their agreement. 78
Using the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts followed the parties’ contractual choice
of law. 79 The court deemed purely manufactured connections—the
agreement that the birth would take place at a Massachusetts hospital, if
possible, and the administration of some prenatal care in that state—
sufficient to justify this choice of law. 80 Accordingly, the parties to the
contract completely evaded New York’s restriction even though the
court conceded that the gestational surrogate, who lived in that state,
came within the scope of its protective policy. 81
As Hodas illustrates, what makes a regime appealing to participants
in a surrogacy arrangement is not merely the absence of a prohibition or
criminal sanctions. Rather, state parentage rules play a vital role as well.
For this reason, California’s doctrine of intent-based parentage has
attracted many surrogacy participants. 82
Windsor’s assertions about federalism in family law fit quite
75. Id. at 325.
76. Id.
77. Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1139 (Mass. 2001).
78. Hodas, 814 N.E.2d at 322.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 325.
82. E.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); see Lewin, supra note 60 (“California has
the most permissive law [in the U.S.], allowing anyone to hire a woman to carry a baby and the
birth certificate to carry the names of the intended parents. As a result, California has a booming
surrogacy industry, attracting clients from around the world.”). Another aspect of the regulatory
regime, fees and costs, explains why American reproductive tourists often go abroad—although this
practice takes us away from the question of federalism.
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comfortably with significant variation in surrogacy and parentage laws
across this country, along with the experimentation and travel that such
variation invites. Thus, this penumbral link between Windsor and
surrogacy supports, rather than challenges, the present patchwork, with
its mix of restrictive and permissive laws. 83
CONCLUSION
The conversation about the appropriate legal treatment of surrogacy
began in earnest over twenty-five years ago with the Baby M litigation
and its aftermath. Although the conversation has continued,
inconsistency and discord persist. Some states have opted for a
restrictive regime, others have taken a permissive approach, and still
others have remained silent. Scholars, commentators, and the public
remain divided as well. 84
Windsor’s invalidation of Section 3 of DOMA does nothing to settle
these longstanding contests. Indeed, precisely because Windsor’s
significance lies in its move toward full inclusion of gay and lesbian
couples in mainstream family law, this landmark case spells no major
break with the past for surrogacy. If we look beyond Windsor’s direct
legal impact, we find that its penumbras—its political, social, and
cultural signals; its promotion of a repronormative understanding of
marriage and family; and its approval of family law federalism—might
refresh our conversations about surrogacy, adding timely talking points,
but without significantly disrupting surrogacy’s status quo.

83. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Hiring a Woman for Her Womb, supra note 26.

